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1. INTRODUCTION 
The precipitous decline of international trade relative to GDP in the 2008-2009 
recession has received quite some attention in the recent academic literature.  Shocks to 
both demand and trade costs have been suggested as important channels (Eaton et al., 
2011).  Among the most prominent explanations for the great trade collapse are 
worsening credit conditions (Chor and Manova, 2012), input demand linkages between 
sectors coupled with trading frictions (Bems, Johnson and Yi, 2011; Bussière et al., 
2011) or reduced expenditure on manufactured goods in general (Behrens, Corcos and 
Mion, 2013).  The literature has provided some insights to understand the mechanisms 
behind the trade decline and to explain its magnitude, but has devoted less attention to 
formulating appropriate policy responses.  Initially, there was a fear that countries would 
raise protectionist barriers, although by and large this did not materialize (Bown and 
Crowley, 2012).  There has been surprisingly little discussion on how governments could 
help firms cope with the fallout from foreign demand and the increase in trading 
frictions. 
In this paper we investigate whether a targeted government program of export 
promotion support can help countries restore their pre-crisis export levels.  A growing 
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literature has documented the success of such programs in raising exports in general.  It 
is conceivable that they are also a valuable tool to help the private sector recover from a 
large trade decline, as experienced by many firms in 2009.  The vast majority of 
countries now run active export promotion programs to facilitate domestic firms’ entry 
into the export market and support subsequent export sales (Lederman, Olarreaga and 
Payton, 2010; Volpe Martincus, 2010).  Rather than provide direct subsidies, these 
programs work mainly as an information depository or a way to spread fixed information 
acquisition costs over exporters.  They help firms to learn about foreign demand for their 
products, establish relationships with importers, identify promising new distribution 
channels, and overcome administrative or trade frictions such as customs procedures and 
foreign regulations or product standards. 
We consider that export promotion only consists of ‘information brokering and 
facilitation.’  Many countries operate separate programs that provide direct export 
subsidies, trade credit and insurance, or state guarantees, which did play a role during the 
crisis in temporarily lifting liquidity constraints or cushion increases in the cost of credit.  
For example, Felbermayr, Heiland and Yalcin (2012) study a program of state credit 
guarantees in Germany that helped sustain export levels.  Effects were stronger when 
market risk was high and when refinancing conditions were tight, as during the financial 
crisis.  More generally, exports are sensitive to financial shocks since international trade 
tends to involve higher default risk and liquidity problems.  Thus, Amiti and Weinstein 
(2011) showed that an important determinant of firm-level exports during a crisis is the 
health of exporters’ financial institutions. 
The latter types of interventions tend to distort competition and in that way impose a 
burden on other countries.  Especially in the context of the great recession, subsidy 
programs or direct financial support will have stronger ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ effects and 
are more likely to raise concerns by trading partners whose firms also faced a collapse in 
global demand.  The export promotion programs we study are less likely to impose costs 
on other countries as they merely aim to reduce transaction costs by reducing 
information asymmetries and alleviate uncertainty (Copeland, 2008).  Aggregate market 
uncertainty has been particularly relevant during the great recession compared to milder 
downturns.  Since export promotion does not change variable costs relative to trading 
partners, it is less likely to distort international competition.  Moreover, as all exporters 
have access to these services, domestic competition is not distorted either.  
Theoretical models of international trade provide some insights into the channels 
through which export promotion can help dampen business cycle effects.  In the 
canonical heterogeneous firm model (see Melitz and Redding, 2014), only those firms 
with a productivity level that exceeds a certain threshold can profitably enter the export 
market.  These destination-specific productivity thresholds are increasing functions of 
bilateral variable costs and fixed costs of trade, which export promotion can help lower.  
For example, international trade involves higher transaction times due to additional 
paperwork, preparation of goods for international shipping, customs procedures, or 
simply longer transit times (Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2010; Volpe Martincus, 
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Carballo, and Graziano, 2015).  Increased uncertainty about global demand and tighter 
financial constraints during the crisis are likely to raise these costs. 
Moreover, lower domestic demand will force firms to operate at lower capacity 
utilization and sacrifice some scale economies.  With lower effective productivity, it is 
even harder to reach the productivity threshold to operate profitably in foreign markets 
and some firms will exit, at least temporarily.  If some of the fixed costs of exporting are 
sunk (Roberts and Tybout, 1997), liquidity constraints can induce wasteful export 
market churn.  To the extent that export promotion helps firms avoid some fixed costs, at 
least temporarily, they are more likely to survive on the export market.  A recent study 
by Eaton et al. (2014) provides evidence that surviving in a foreign market requires 
continuous search effort for new clients.  As existing partners go bankrupt during a 
crisis, information provision by export promotion agencies becomes more valuable. 
We make three contributions to the export promotion literature.  First, ours is the first 
paper to analyze the impact of export promotion during the great trade collapse.  In line 
with previous studies, we exploit detailed information on export transactions observed 
by firm, product and destination market.  A second contribution is to evaluate similar 
export promotion policies for two economies, Belgium and Peru, with a different type of 
integration in international markets and different comparative advantages.  We 
investigate whether this influences the effectiveness of export promotion activities.  
Belgian firms are strongly integrated into the EU economy—about 50% of exports go to 
its immediate neighbors—and they mostly export differentiated manufacturing goods.  
Peruvian firms export primarily to faraway places—fewer than 20% of exports remain in 
Latin America or the Caribbean—and the national export portfolio is dominated by 
mining products, basic manufacturers, and agricultural or food products.  Third, we do 
not only study the impact of export promotion on firms’ level of exports, but look 
specifically at whether it helps firms to survive in the export market overall or in 
destination or product markets that are especially hard hit by the financial crisis. 
A first descriptive analysis illustrates that the export decline during the recession was 
very sudden in both countries, limited to 2009 and 2010, and mostly due to reduced 
firm-level sales on existing export markets.  Therefore, we use firm-level total export as 
our primary dependent variable.  Further preliminary evidence suggests that self-
selection into export support cannot be ruled out and has to be taken into account to 
identify causal effects on performance.  In the absence of a plausible instrument, we 
follow the literature and at first address program endogeneity by relying on the selection-
on-observables assumption, i.e. that potential exports for supported and other firms are 
the same in expectation after conditioning on a rich set of control variables.  We later 
estimate our model at the firm-market level as well, which allows the inclusion of firm 
(and market) fixed effects to control more flexibly for a firm-level unobservable in 
export performance.  We show OLS results and implement two alternative estimators 
from the treatment evaluation literature, i.e. a matching estimator and inverse-probability 
weighting, that achieve the conditioning on observables more flexibly. 
The results indicate that supported firms have higher exports during the crisis and that 
the magnitude of the difference is rather similar for the two countries.  Supported firms 
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are significantly more likely to remain active exporters—especially Peruvian firms and 
Belgian firms that export outside the EU—and they export relatively more than 
unsupported firms.  We still find positive effects if we identify them from exporters’ 
relative performance in product and destination markets most affected by the crisis, 
while controlling for unobservables using firm-fixed effects.  In most specifications we 
find that the destination and product extensive margins are the primary channels for 
superior firm-level export performance.  Supported firms export more because they are 
significantly more likely to continue exporting to destinations directly hit by a financial 
crisis and to continue exporting products that are most crisis-prone, such as capital goods 
or in industries sensitive to financial constraints.  Export volumes for supported firms are 
often not significantly different from those of control firms that manage to survive in the 
same destinations or product markets.  An exception are the results for Peru, which are 
large and borderline significant in the firm-destination regressions and strongly 
significant in the firm-product-destination regressions for 2009 and 2010. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We start in Section 2 with a 
review of the existing evidence on the export-boosting success of trade promotion 
programs, both from a macro and a micro perspective.  In Section 3 we provide some 
background information on the activities of the two agencies we study.  In Sections 4 
and 5 we discuss the data and document the evolution of exports and the use of export 
support services during the crisis.  The empirical framework for assessing whether the 
quick recovery of exports is systematically related to export promotion is presented in 
Section 6, followed by our estimates in Section 7.  Finally, in Section 8 we provide some 
policy conclusions. 
2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF EXPORT PROMOTION? 
2.1. Defining export promotion 
Governments around the world use various policy instruments to stimulate their firms’ 
exports.
1
  Leaving aside macroeconomic measures such as exchange rate policy, some of 
these instruments provide firms with financial resources directly or help them indirectly 
cope with a credit crunch.  These include direct subsidies associated with export 
requirements (Helmers and Trofimenko, 2013; Defever and Riaño, 2014) and export 
credit guarantees (Abraham and Dewit, 2000; Egger and Url, 2006; Moser et al., 2008; 
Felbermayr and Yalcin, 2013).  Some other policies that subsidize firms directly do not 
target exports, but are likely to affect them.  These include, for example, production 
subsidies (Girma, Gong, Görg and Yu 2009, Girma, Görg and Wagner 2009), support for 
investing in technology, training, or physical capital (Görg et al., 2008), VAT 
reimbursement rules (Gourdon et al., 2014), and preferential regulation and taxation in 
economic development zones (Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 2013). 
                                                          
1 Private sector associations may also assist firms in selling abroad (Hiller, 2012). 
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In addition, there are “soft” public interventions aimed to stimulate exports.  Two 
important policies are, first, general economic diplomacy, where governments rely on 
international relations through permanent foreign missions such as embassies and 
consulates or state visits (Rose, 2007; Nitsch, 2007; Head and Ries, 2010; Veenstra et 
al., 2010; Creusen and Lejour, 2012; Fergusson and Forslid, 2014), and, second, explicit 
export promotion programs (Lederman et al., 2010; Volpe Martincus, 2010).
2
   
In this paper, we focus on the last instrument: support by export promotion agencies.  
It can be defined as a set of activities to help firms overcome internationalization 
obstacles, for example by providing data on the general export process and on specific 
markets and overseas business contacts, by disseminating information on domestic 
firms’ products and services, by assisting in the preparation and follow-up of firms’ 
participation in international marketing events such as fairs and missions, or by co-
financing travel costs through matching grants. 
These activities are likely to reduce the fixed costs that firms incur when penetrating a 
new foreign market and when searching for new customers in existing export markets.  
They address a market failure in the form of information externalities.  As economic 
transactions resulting from successful searches reveal valuable information for third 
firms, they generate positive spillovers.  If only part of the potential benefits accrue to 
the firms investing in searches, aggregate investment to explore business opportunities 
will be sub-optimally low, as will be the diversification of exports (Volpe Martincus, 
2010). 
It is worth mentioning that some support activities are carried out by foreign offices of 
export promotion agencies that may be located within embassies and consulates, or are 
even carried out by the diplomatic representations themselves.  This introduces an 
identification challenge.  Note, however, that export promotion organizations are 
typically highly specialized, often managed according to private sector practices and 
employing personnel with a background in international trade.  This differs from 
embassies or consulates which do not always have a trade section and sometimes lack 
staff with the necessary business expertise or the time and incentives to assist exporters 
(Volpe Martincus, 2010).
3
  
 The effectiveness of export promotion has been evaluated in several ways.  
Researchers have relied on measures of export promotion at the agency level, in the form 
of available financial resources or the extent of the network of offices abroad, or at the 
beneficiary level, by observing which firms take advantage of these programs.  Table 1 
includes an exhaustive list of empirical evaluations that cover approximately the last two 
decades.  We first review analyses with a macro perspective that relate export promotion 
organizations’ budget and network of offices to export volumes.  Next we turn to studies 
that use a micro perspective to evaluate the impact of export promotion support on 
various dimensions of firm-level export performance. 
                                                          
2 There are several papers that show the importance of access to financing for export (e.g., Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; 
Paravisini et al., 2015; and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2014). 
3 Especially for developing countries, coordination between export promotion organizations and foreign diplomatic missions 
that are supposed to assists them in their work is generally weak (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
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[Include Table 1 approximately here] 
2.2. The macro perspective 
2.2.1. Financial resources devoted to export promotion 
A few studies examine the effects of trade promotion on trade outcomes by exploiting 
variation in public expenditures on these programs.  At the regional level, Coughlin and 
Cartwright (1987) report that exports of US states covary positively with the states’ trade 
promotion budget.  In particular, each additional dollar in promotion expenditures is 
associated with $432 additional manufacturing exports.  In a similar study for Argentina, 
Castro and Saslavsky (2009) conclude that a dollar invested in export promotion 
translates into $240 addition foreign sales for the average province.  In contrast, making 
use of variation in the export support budget across US states normalized by the number 
of in-state firms, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find no systematic relationship with the 
export propensity of firms from each state, once a number of firm-level characteristics 
are controlled for.  They conjecture that the lack of effect is the result of agencies 
targeting small and medium-sized firms, which rarely export anywhere. 
At the national level, Lederman, Olarreaga, and Payton (2010) use a sample of export 
promotion organizations from 103 countries and show that their budgets are positively 
and statistically significantly related to national exports.  They find an elasticity of 12%, 
which indicates that a one percent increase in an agency’s budget is associated with 0.12 
percent higher national exports.  In absolute terms, evaluated for the median agency, a 
one-dollar increase in the trade promotion budget is associated with a 40-dollar increase 
in national exports.   
While these numbers are useful as a first approximation for the relationship between 
resources spent on export promotion and export performance, the exact estimates should 
be read with extreme caution since the identification of such a relationship is subject to 
major data and methodological difficulties (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
2.2.2. Network of foreign offices 
In the spirit of Rose (2007), several studies investigate the effects of either the 
presence or the number of foreign offices operated by export promotion agencies on both 
country and region-level export outcomes.  Using bilateral product-level trade data from 
Spain for the years 1995-2011, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) find that the export promotion 
offices established abroad by Spanish regions are associated with higher exports, 
particularly for differentiated goods.  They highlight the expansion in the number of 
products and the number of transactions per product, but interestingly, they also find that 
the effect increases with the age of the office, a plausible proxy for its experience in a 
destination. 
In the same vein, Hayakawa et al. (2014) find large effects from bureaus of Japan’s 
and South Korea’s trade promotion organizations.  The presence of an office in a 
destination raises exports by a similar amount as would the establishment of a Free 
EXPORT PROMOTION DURING THE CRISIS 
 
7 
Trade Agreement with that country, a remarkable finding.  Finally, Cassey (2014) makes 
use of the location of overseas trade-support offices that individual US states have 
established.  His sample contains 228 offices covering 31 countries.  He estimates that an 
overseas branch lowers the variable export cost by between 0.04% and 0.10%, which 
makes them cost-effective if the annual export volume to a country exceeds $850 
million. 
Given that the trade promotion agencies’ budgets as well as the location of their offices 
are likely to be endogenous to the level of aggregate or bilateral exports, any causal 
interpretation is only as reliable as the identifying assumptions used in the estimations 
and specifically the instrumentation strategy (if any). 
2.3. The micro perspective: Exploiting information on firm-level support 
2.3.1. The impact on export outcomes  
A large number of studies have directly evaluated the ability of national export 
promotion agencies to raise the exports of their clients.  Researchers working with data 
from different countries have matched individual firm information on trade transactions 
to client registries from the aforementioned agencies, making impact evaluation studies 
possible at the firm level.  Various statistical methods from the treatment evaluation 
literature have been used to construct an appropriate benchmark for treated firms.  
Following Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008), many studies have used a matching 
difference-in-differences estimator, relying on propensity score matching to construct an 
appropriate control group.  Other studies, for example, Van Biesebroeck, Yu and Chen 
(2015) and Volpe Martincus et al. (2012), used the propensity score to construct weights 
and implement a double-robust estimator. 
Table 1 lists all studies using firm-level evidence on export promotion by country.  In 
total, 21 studies covering 16 countries are listed, almost all conducted within the last 
decade.  Studying the intensive margin of trade—i.e. the impact on a client’s total export 
level—is easier than studying the firm extensive margin—i.e. whether support draws 
new firms into the export market—since the latter requires information on the universe 
of potential exporters.  Most studies only observe outcomes for existing exporters, but it 
still allows researchers to evaluate effects at the product and the destination extensive 
margins.  Helping firms diversify their exports and reach different destination or product 
markets is often an explicit goal of the agencies. 
It is impossible to summarize all findings, but it is fair to say that almost all studies 
find a positive and significant effect of export promotion support on firm-level exports.  
Most studies rely on the selection-on-observables assumption, often supplemented with 
firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable factors.  The conclusion that 
export promotion causes higher exports is thus only valid if the unobservable factors that 
compel some firms to rely on export promotion, while other observationally equivalent 
firms do not rely on it, are uncorrelated with firms’ export potential (in the absence of 
support).  Unfortunately, this assumption is not testable.  It is encouraging, however, that 
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the estimated effects tend to be larger when the type of firm or the type of trade is likely 
to face more severe information problems (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
First, trade promotion is estimated to have the strongest effects on export activities that 
involve the most information incompleteness.  Effects are estimated to be particularly 
large at the firm extensive margin when firms attempt to venture into foreign markets for 
the first time (Cruz, 2014; Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 2015; Lederman, Olarreaga 
and Zavala, 2015; Mion and Muûls, 2015), or when firms try to enter into an entirely 
new country or product market (Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008, 2010c; Schminke 
and Van Biesebroeck, 2015).
4
 
Second, many studies document heterogeneous effects by firm and product types.  For 
example, more complex goods are likely to face more severe information barriers, which 
is consistent with larger estimated gains for differentiated goods (Volpe Martincus and 
Carballo, 2012).  Smaller firms with less exposure to international markets are likely to 
face greater difficulties obtaining the necessary trading information, which is in line with 
the higher estimated benefits of export assistance to these smaller firms (Munch and 
Schaur, 2015).  Finally, bundled support services provided throughout the exporting 
process, e.g. accompany firms from the early business contacts to the establishment of 
commercial relationships, are found to be more effective than isolated actions, e.g. only 
providing matching grants to participate in an international mission (Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo, 2010a).  
A recent study by Cadot et al. (2015) suggests that export promotion effects may not 
be durable.  They show that both previously supported firms and control firms achieve 
the same export performance after a number of years.  It should be noted, however, that 
this result is so far based on a single application, the Tunisian FAMEX initiative, which 
differs from the operations of traditional export promotion agencies in important 
aspects.
5
  Further research is needed to establish external validity.
6
  Our results below do 
show that export promotion helps firms survive on the export market, a necessary 
condition for long-term effects. 
2.3.2. Beyond export outcomes and beyond export promotion  
Mainly due to data limitations, several relevant policy questions are still unanswered.  
It is important to keep in mind that these programs aim to facilitate economic activities 
believed to generate productivity growth and employment expansion.
7
  By increasing 
foreign sales, trade promotion might improve firms’ performance more broadly.  Using 
firm-level data from Denmark, Munch and Schaur (2015) show that export promotion 
positively affects sales, employment, and worker productivity, particularly for smaller 
                                                          
4 UKTI, the UK trade and investment promotion organization, has a formal economic and research team that carries out and 
commissions evaluation studies, which can be found on their website. 
5 Contrary to most programs, export promotion was outsourced to third parties selected by the participating firms themselves.  
It is not obvious that firms with no or little export experience would be able to select an appropriate service provider.  
Moreover, quality differences in these providers’ services could translate into heterogeneity in the trade promotion treatment 
and reduce estimated persistence. 
6 Carballo (2012) already provides some contrary evidence. 
7 In particular, the empirical literature has clearly established that productivity leads to exports, and there might even be 
feedback effects from exporting (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2005). 
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firms and after an adjustment period.  Rincón-Aznar, Riley and Rosso (2015) carry out a 
similar analysis for UK firms and find a positive impact on sales growth and, to a more 
limited extent, on labor productivity growth. 
Evaluations of export promotion have focused on a single program, while firms often 
receive assistance in several domains.  These other forms of assistance can also affect 
export outcomes and interact with trade promotion.  For instance, innovation subsidies 
might lead to improved production processes and higher productivity or to new product 
varieties that facilitate entry into foreign markets.  Álvarez, Crespi, and Volpe Martincus 
(2014) investigate the existence of complementarities between export and innovation 
promotion programs in shaping Chilean firms’ export performance over the 2002-2010 
period.  They find that firms which previously participated in the innovation promotion 
program were able to benefit more from subsequent trade promotion than firms only 
using the latter or using both programs simultaneously (thus not allowing innovation to 
mature).  In other words, the sequencing of programs was important for maximizing 
their synergies. 
In closing this section, we should mention that, albeit there are some clear knowledge 
gaps, there is a substantial amount of research on the effects of export promotion on 
export outcomes.  Moreover, in the introduction we cited an emerging literature 
explaining the great trade collapse following the global financial crisis.  As of yet, there 
is no connection between these two literatures.  We do not know whether trade 
promotion contributed to firms' adjustment to the financial turmoil and, if so, to what 
extent.  This is precisely the link that our analysis will explore. 
3. EXPORT SUPPORT AGENCIES 
3.1. PROMPERU 
PROMPERU is Peru’s public export promotion organization and is headquartered in 
Lima.
8
  Its highest governing body is the Board of Directors, which is chaired by the 
minister of foreign trade and tourism and is composed of representatives from the public 
and private sectors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, the Exporters Association and Peru’s Society of Foreign Trade.  In addition 
to the board, PROMPERU’s organizational structure consists of a general secretary and 
two divisions, one for export promotion and one for tourism promotion. 
Currently, the agency’s budget is $76.8 million.  Annual resources available for the 
export promotion division are $18.6 million with most of the budget provided directly by 
the government.  As of September 2015 PROMPERU had 380 employees of which 94 
are with the export division.  This division has units responsible for market intelligence, 
                                                          
8 PROMPERU employees manage six regional offices within Peru which provide local companies with basic training and 
general information on the export process and foreign markets.  In addition, the agency has regional information centers that 
are staffed and managed by employees of local governments or business associations, which not only organize training 
activities, but facilitate access to information on marketing, prices of products with overseas demand, profiles of products with 
greater demand abroad, and export procedures and tax regimes (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
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capacity building (export development), and trade promotion.  Many employees have 
previous experience in foreign trade.
9
 
PROMPERU’s main goal is to contribute to the internationalization of Peruvian firms 
by fostering their penetration of foreign markets and consolidating their positions in 
these markets.  In pursuing this goal, the organization provides firms with multiple 
services.  It trains inexperienced firms on the export process, marketing, and 
negotiations; performs and disseminates analyses on country and product market trends; 
provides specific information on trade opportunities abroad as well as specialized 
counseling and technical assistance on how to take advantage of these opportunities; 
coordinates and supports (and sometimes co-finances) firms’ participation in 
international trade missions or fairs and, importantly, arranges meetings with potential 
foreign buyers; organizes these types of trade events; and sponsors the creation of 
consortia of firms aiming to strengthen their competitive position in external markets. 
3.2. Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) 
In Belgium, export promotion is organized under three regional, government-funded 
agencies.  We use information from the Flemish agency, Flanders Investment & Trade 
(FIT).  They serve firms located in Flanders and Brussels which account for more than 
80% of Belgian goods trade.  If some (multi-plant) firms in our sample receive support 
from one of the other two regional agencies but we still include them in the control 
group, it would mitigate the effects we estimate.
10
 
FIT has its headquarters in Brussels, regional offices in the five provincial capitals and 
field offices in approximately 90 locations abroad.  Its total budget in 2009 was €56.3 
million.  Most of this, 86%, came directly from the Flemish government, with fee 
income from services covering around €3 million.  Its largest expense is maintaining the 
network of offices in Belgium and abroad.  Almost one quarter of the budget, €13.5 
million in 2009, is directed towards matching grants linked to a business trip or 
participation in a fair.  The average grant is quite limited, approximately €2,000 per 
request. 
FIT has provided us with detailed information on the intensity and nature of 
interactions with each of its clients.  In order of importance, as considered by FIT itself, 
they interact with potential or current exporters using four types of promotion 
instruments—actions, questions, subsidies, and communications. 
The category ‘actions’ comprises activities outside day-to-day support.  They mainly 
include events that FIT organizes to help firms access markets abroad, such as 
information seminars in Brussels, prospection tours or trade missions, helping firms to 
participate in a trade fair, or arranging a meeting with foreign buyers. 
                                                          
9 We thank Carlos Diaz from PROMPERU for providing up-to-date budget and employment figures. 
10 We obtained comparable support information from Brussels Invest & Export, the agency that serves firms from the Brussels-
Capital region, but due to a shorter sample period we cannot include it in the analysis.  We did use the information to exclude 
firms working with both agencies, as described in the data section. 
EXPORT PROMOTION DURING THE CRISIS 
 
11 
‘Questions’ are requests for information that involve some research by FIT employees 
(located domestically or abroad).  They cover a range of interactions where companies 
may ask for information on markets or potential partners, or for help setting up an 
appointment schedule on a business trip or when prospecting a foreign market.  
Questions are generally transmitted to the field office in the concerned country.   
‘Subsidies’ are all forms of financial incentives given to individual companies, which 
are mostly co-payments to support foreign trips.  They also include capital good 
subsidies and feasibility studies which were previously under the realm of development 
aid.  This category is targeted to small and medium-sized firms. 
Finally, ‘communication’ is the category covering the remainder of interactions 
between FIT and client firms.  Examples are confirmations of a lunch appointment with 
the CEO, a reference to a local consultant, or the submission of a transcript of a FIT 
lecture about international entrepreneurship.  
For each of the four promotion instruments we observe the frequency that each firm 
used FIT services between 2002 and 2011, but not which export destination the firm was 
targeting.  PROMPERU provides similar types of support, distinguishing between three 
categories: missions, questions, and other.  Unfortunately, the PROMPERU data we 
received only indicates whether a firm is supported, not the type of support it received.  
Trade missions and participation in trade fairs tend to play a much larger role than in the 
operations of FIT. 
4. DATA 
The literature has only analyzed the average impact of export promotion services, 
irrespective of the business cycle.  It seems plausible, however, that the demand for these 
services and perhaps even their usefulness is enhanced during cyclical downturns.  To 
investigate this possibility, we use information on export performance and the incidence 
of support at the firm level for Belgium and Peru.   
For both countries we have access to information on all trade transactions for 
individual firms, broken down by country destination and detailed product level.  For 
Belgium, foreign trade data is available separately for extra-EU transactions from 
Belgian Customs and for intra-EU transactions through the Intrastat inquiry.
11
  Exports 
to destinations outside the EU are recorded at the firm-product-month level for all export 
flows that exceed a value of €1,000 or a weight of 1,000 kg—in practice even lower 
trade flows are often observed.  In contrast, firms are only required to report their within-
EU exports if the combined value across all EU member states exceeds a threshold, 
which was €250,000 until 2005 but was raised to €1 million in 2006.  If this is the case, 
firms report their exports individually for each product-country pair.  
Comparable information from Peruvian Customs is available with even greater product 
detail.  We aggregate trade flows in both countries to the annual frequency and 6-digit 
product level of the Harmonized System.  For Peru we only observe exporters and not 
                                                          
11 Complete information on the Belgian trade datasets can be consulted here: https://www.nbb.be/en/statistics/foreign-trade.  
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the universe of active firms.  Hence we focus on survival and continued success on the 
export market and abstract from export market entry. 
We have separate information on which firms benefit from support activities of the 
respective regional or national export promotion agencies, FIT for firms in Flanders 
(Belgium), and PROMPERU for firms in Peru.  We provided detailed information on the 
nature of these services in the previous section and below we describe how their use 
evolved over the recession. 
The information from these two data sources is readily matched at the firm-year level 
using a unique firm identifier.  For Belgium we observe the trade information over the 
entire 1998-2013 period and export support over 2001-2011.  The data for Peru covers 
the 2000-2012 period.  To concentrate on the same time period in both countries and 
work with a sample that has consistent reporting thresholds, most of the analysis is 
limited to 2006-2011.  This period is also ideal for focusing on the effectiveness of 
export support specifically during the economic crisis, which reduced trade flows 
primarily in 2009 and 2010.
12
  In the descriptive analysis we use one year after the crisis 
to illustrate the return to normality. 
After merging both data sources for each country, we obtain an unbalanced panel of 
firms.  For Belgium, there are 50,581 unique firms and 144,045 firm-year observations 
in the 2006-2011 period.  For Peru the corresponding statistics are 22,747 and 49,197.  
Table 2 shows the breakdown by export and support status.  For Belgium, 13% of 
exporters receive support, while 55% of firms that receive support are exporters.  The 
number of exporters declined slightly over the sample period, but we do see an uptick in 
the number of firms receiving support during the crisis years 2009 and 2010.  For Peru, a 
slightly smaller fraction of exporters (10%) receive support, but out of the firms that 
receive support a much smaller fraction are exporters (only 29%).  The vast majority of 
these trade-inexperienced clients only receive support during a single year. 
[Include Table 2 approximately here] 
In most of the analysis we limit the sample to firms that export in 2006, with or 
without support.  For Belgium this comprises 23,024 firms and for Peru 6,472 firms, but 
we only observe complete information for 6,268 of them.  Subject to the reporting 
threshold on trade transactions (in Belgium), this is the universe of exporters in 2006.  
When we conduct an analysis at the firm-destination, the firm-product, or the firm-
destination-product level we observe more observations for this same group of exporters.  
For example, the Belgian firms served on average 6.1 destinations with 3.0 products for 
a total of 13.4 product markets per firm in 2006.  The extensive margin analysis will rely 
on all these observations, but at the intensive margin many observations drop out since 
firms tend to leave some product or destination markets as time progresses. 
                                                          
12 The datasets used in this paper extend the sample periods used in the work of Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2015) for 
Belgium and Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) for Peru. 
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5. EXPORTS AND EXPORT SUPPORT OVER THE CRISIS 
5.1. Evolution of exports over the crisis 
Before we explore the relationship between export promotion activities and exports, 
we document the evolution of exports over the crisis and show which dimensions of 
export performance were most affected.  This will provide some insight into the type of 
firms for which support might be particularly valuable. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of aggregate exports in billions of euros or dollars, which 
highlights the suddenness of the export collapse in both countries relative to the trend 
rate of growth.  In all figures and tables, we show results for Belgium on the left and for 
Peru on the right.  The rapid recovery of exports back to trend after the recession is 
equally remarkable as the sudden reduction in 2009.  In Belgium the export decline in 
2009, relative to trend growth, was 0.22 log-points and in Peru it was 0.24.  While GDP 
was mostly flat after the recession, barely re-starting growth from the lower level, 
aggregate exports experienced two years of growth rates that were far above trend to 
make up the lost ground.  In both countries, exports were back at their 2008 level by 
2010 and by 2011 they were even ahead of the trend, as if the recession never happened.  
Our objective is to investigate what role export promotion played in this recovery. 
[Include Figure 1 approximately here] 
To further illustrate the evolution over the crisis, we plot for a number of variables the 
residual from a regression (in logarithms) on a linear time trend over the 2006-2013 
(Belgium) or 2006-2012 (Peru) periods.  The two crisis years, 2009 and 2010, are 
omitted when determining the trend.  The lines in the different panels of Figure 2 show 
the deviation from the trend, illustrating the depth and duration of the trade collapse.  In 
the different panels, the change in aggregate exports is decomposed into separate 
adjustment margins. 
In the top panel of Figure 2, we separately show the change in the number of exporters 
(dashed line) and the evolution of average exports per firm (solid line).  In both 
countries, the trade reduction was primarily due to lower exports per firm rather than 
fewer firms exporting.  In Belgium, the number of exporters fell by an average of 2.5% 
per year over the entire 2006-2013 period and this downward trend became somewhat 
more pronounced between 2008 and 2011.  Exports per firm, in contrast, switched from 
an average annual growth rate of 7.5% to a sudden drop of 14%—or 22% below trend—
in 2009.  In Peru, the two lines evolve even more differently.  The number of exporters 
was growing gradually over the entire period, while the strong growth in average exports 
per firm contracted briefly in 2009, but recovered very quickly. 
[Include Figure 2 approximately here] 
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The second panel separately shows the evolution of the number of product markets, 
export destinations and the average firm-level sales within each product-destination 
market.  Each variable is aggregated over all firms and then purged from the time trend.  
The trade reduction is primarily due to a within-firm adjustment on the intensive margin: 
lower exports by market.  Only in Peru is there an additional reduction in the number of 
products exported, but the decline is much less pronounced.  This is consistent with the 
evidence in Haddad, Harrison and Hausman (2010) for a broader range of countries. 
One could also trace the evolution of these three variables—number of markets, 
number of products, and exports per market—at the firm level without aggregating.  
Using a full set of year dummies in a regression that includes firm-fixed effects captures 
these growth rates.  In Belgium, the firm-level patterns we thus obtain mimic the 
aggregate evolutions almost perfectly.  In Peru, however, the firm-level regressions show 
a less pronounced drop in exports by market for individual firms.  Although the within-
market change is still the primary adjustment mechanism, this experience was less 
uniformly shared by all Peruvian firms. 
The bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates that the export experience for Belgian firms 
tends to be similar for destinations within or outside the EU.  This distinction is 
potentially important as the reporting threshold is much higher within the EU and for the 
vast majority of small exporters we only observe exports for destinations outside the EU.  
The graph suggests that extra-EU exports evolve similarly: they start declining slightly 
earlier, bottom out slightly lower, but recover at the same rate as within-EU exports. 
While the crisis was concentrated in 2009 and the recovery was very swift, the severity 
of the export decline did vary across sectors and destinations.  It is useful to keep in 
mind that the economies of Belgium and Peru and their average export portfolios do 
differ.  In particular, Peruvian exports contain much less finished manufactured products 
and are more concentrated in a few sectors.  Mining products and non-metal basic 
manufactures account for more than half of all Peruvian exports.  Its top 5 sectors, out of 
a total of 17, cover 82% of aggregate exports.  Belgian exports are dominated by 
finished manufactured goods and are less concentrated, with the 5 most important 
sectors only accounting for 47% of aggregate exports.
13
 
On the destination side, the reverse pattern holds.  Belgium is strongly embedded in a 
broader EU production network, which accounts for 76% of total exports over this 
period; 48% even goes to its four immediate neighbors.  The fast-growing BRIC 
countries and other large developing economies receive less than 8% of Belgian exports.  
In contrast, Peruvian export markets are highly diversified with approximately 19% of 
exports going to Latin America and the Caribbean, 17% to the United States, 18% to the 
EU, 15% to China, and 8% to Japan and South Korea combined. 
                                                          
13  The most important export categories for Belgium are mineral fuel and four types of finished manufactured goods: 
pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, plastic products, and metal articles. 
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5.2. Export support over the crisis: some facts 
We next show how the use of export promotion support from the two agencies has 
evolved over the crisis.
14
  The black solid line in Figure 3 shows the number of firms that 
draw on these services each year.  In Belgium, the number of individual firms supported 
rose from 3,752 in 2006 to 4,577 in 2011.  It increased gradually as the crisis hit and 
topped out in 2010, 22% above the level of 2006.  The general pattern is similar for Peru, 
but the 50% increase from 2006 to 2009 is much more pronounced and largely predates 
the export decline. 
[Include Figure 3 approximately here] 
The dashed line shows the number of new firms that receive support.  It only counts 
firms not supported in 2006, and in the first year we observe them as trade promotion 
clients.  From 2007 to 2008, their number declined in Belgium, but it is likely that some 
of the “new clients” in 2007 were pre-existing clients that simply skipped using the 
service in 2006, the first year of our data.  The increase in new FIT clients from 2008 to 
2010 is likely to be more reliable, but the 7% change from 1,681 to 1,797 is very modest.  
For Peru, the number of new clients increased in 2008 and similar over-counting in 2007 
is likely to understate the increase.  From 2008 onwards, the number of new clients 
unambiguously declined.  The adverse international trade environment in 2008-2010 
seems to have convinced many firms to postpone their foreign expansion plans. 
For Belgium, we observe not only whether a firm uses the service in a particular year, 
but also the total number of activities it participated in.  Firms can draw on each type of 
services more than once a year and most clients do.  The solid grey line in Figure 3 
shows the evolution for the sum of activities across all firms.  This total usage was 6% 
higher in 2009 than in 2006, but declined quickly as the crisis subsided.  The average 
number of support instances over the sample period was 5.5 times per firm, falling 
gradually from 6.0 in 2006 and 2007 to 4.7 in 2010 and 2011.  As FIT attracted more 
marginal, low-use clients, the number of unique firms supported (in black) increased 
more strongly than the total number of support instances (in grey). 
Uniquely for Belgium, again, we even observe the date of support and the dotted line 
shows the evolution of total support at a quarterly frequency.  It reveals that the use of 
export promotion services is highly seasonal, with a peak in the first quarter of the year.  
It also reveals that the increase over the crisis is somewhat masked in the annual data.  
The peaks of the dotted line rise more rapidly than the solid grey line.  The same is true 
for the number of new FIT clients, where the barely noticeable upswing during the 
recession is more pronounced at the quarterly frequency.  Comparing the same quarter, 
the number of new clients rose by 38% from 490 in 2008Q1 to 676 in 2010Q1 or by 
18% from 349 in 2008Q3 to 413 in 2010Q3.  Starting from the fourth quarter in 2010, 
the number of new clients starts declining again. 
                                                          
14 For Belgium, information for 2011 only covers the first three quarters.  Annual use statistics are scaled up to reflect the 
entire year. 
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  The composition of firms asking for export promotion support also shows a number 
of patterns over the crisis.  Firms that are not (yet) exporting account for an increasing 
share of total support.  This fraction rises from 41% to 49% of all clients in Belgium and 
from 64% to 71% in Peru.  From 2009 onwards, this share declines again.  Among 
Belgian exporters, the use of export support services shifts slightly towards low-volume 
exporters, firms only serving extra-EU destinations, and firms only exporting a single 
product or serving only a single destination. 
6. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
After providing background information on the evolution of exports and the use of 
export promotion services during the crisis, we now evaluate whether export promotion 
can be linked to the rapid recovery in export sales that we documented.  In principle, 
three avenues are possible to make causal inferences.  If firms select into treatment at 
least partially based on unobservables that also influence performance, consistent 
estimation of the treatment effect requires an instrument that is correlated with this 
selection, but not with the residual in the export performance regression.  Van 
Biesebroeck (2005) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) are two rare studies using a credible 
instrument for export market selection, using owner ethnicity and an important trade 
partner’s tariff rates, respectively, but in our datasets no such instrument is available to 
predict participation in an export promotion program.  
A second identification strategy is to conduct a randomized control trial, as used by 
Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman (2014) to study the impact that exporting has on firm 
performance.  They split a large purchase order from a foreign buyer into smaller orders 
and offered them to a random subset of small rug manufacturers in Egypt.  As the 
researchers themselves control the assignment, they generate random variation in export 
opportunities which guarantees exogenous variation in treatment.  While this approach 
achieves clean identification, it is not without its own problems.  It is inherently difficult 
to generalize from a single experimental study conducted in one specific environment.  
For example, out of the 149 firms they approached, only 28 agreed to participate and, in 
a way, enter the export market.  Given the very low ex-ante export propensity of the 
sample population, it is unclear whether this take-up rate can be considered high or low.  
To keep the costs of the study manageable, micro firms were targeted, but they are quite 
different from the majority of firms that regular export promotion agencies work with.  
Finally, contacting a producer with a one-time offer to fulfill one order differs from a 
typical export promotion intervention aimed at establishing international relationships 
and opening up avenues for future expansion.
15
  Given the challenges in carrying out a 
project like this, which are well documented in the paper, statistical assumptions are 
likely to remain our main source of identification. 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that this study was not designed to learn about export promotion.  While informative about the specific 
setting and the reluctance of small firms to enter the export market, the broader relevance for the effectiveness of export 
promotion is limited. 
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The primary identification strategy followed in the existing literature in this area is to 
invoke the selection-on-observables assumption.  A generic performance regression 
looks like this: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .       (1) 
The α coefficient informs us as to whether firms that receive support (𝑆 = 1) achieve 
higher exports (𝑦), conditional on a set of time-varying control variables (𝑍) and fixed 
effects (𝛾).  The main challenge to infer causality from this regression is self-selection 
into treatment by firms with better export potential even in the absence of support.  With 
non-random selection, the support dummy will be correlated with the error term and 
biased upward. 
We follow the standard solution in the export promotion literature and assume that 
conditional on covariates, selection into treatment is random.  More specifically, we 
assume that the export performance of supported and control firms would have been the 
same in the absence of support as long as we condition on a sufficiently rich set of 
observables (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  In the potential outcome notation, we 
assume that 𝐸[𝑦0|𝑍, 𝑆 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑦0|𝑍, 𝑆 = 0].16   Combined with the law of iterated 
expectations, i.e. 𝐸[∙] = 𝐸𝑍{𝐸[∙ |𝑍]}, this permits an estimation of the average treatment 
effect on the treated, defined as 𝐸[𝑦1 − 𝑦0| 𝑆 = 1]. 
The so-called selection-on-observables assumption is undeniably restrictive, but in the 
absence of an instrument or the ability to manipulate selection directly, it is the only way 
to proceed.  It requires that firms’ export potential is uncorrelated with the unobservables 
that compel some firms to request export promotion support while other observationally 
equivalent firms do not request support.  Random exposure to advertisements for the 
agencies’ services could be one such factor, while operating in a location nearby one of 
the agencies’ offices or near a former client’s establishment could be another.17 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide a state of the art overview of how to 
implement the crucial conditioning.  The simplest way is to include the appropriate set of 
control variables directly in equation (1).  They also discuss alternative estimators that 
often involve estimating a treatment selection model in a first step, which is then used to 
calculate the propensity score, i.e. the predicted probability of treatment, for all firms.  In 
a second step, matching techniques or probability-weighting can then be used to 
construct an appropriate performance benchmark for supported firms.
18
 
To investigate which firm-level observables are correlated with support, we estimate 
the following selection model: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .    (2) 
                                                          
16 𝐸[y] is the expected export performance and the superscripts 0 and 1 indicate the potential outcomes under either treatment 
regime for a given firm.  Naturally, if a firm is supported we do not observe 𝑦0 and therefore need to estimate it from a group 
of control firms (which have 𝑆 = 0). 
17 Breinlich, Donaldson, Nolen, and Wright (2015) present evidence from the results of a randomized controlled trial on the 
role that information plays in firms’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of exporting. 
18 Another statistical tool from the treatment evaluation literature, regression discontinuity design, has not been used in this 
particular literature because in most countries all firms qualify for support. 
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We first estimate equation (2) using a linear probability model that allows for the 
inclusion of firm-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖) in addition to firm-level covariates (Z) and a time-
fixed effect.  We also estimate a variant of this model that replaces the firm-fixed effects 
with additional covariates and sector-fixed effects.  The estimates provide direct insights 
into whether the firms that ask for support are systematically different and whether the 
timing of support can be linked to observables, including past export performance.
19
 
The equations we estimate to actually measure the difference in export performance 
between supported and other firms differs from the generic equation (1) in several 
respects.  They take the following form: 
 I(Exports𝑖𝑡 > 0) = 𝛼1 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ,          (3) 
ln (Exports𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼2 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .               (4) 
Some adjustments are motivated by our specific objectives, and others reflect insights 
from the preliminary estimates of equations (1) and (2).  We discuss them in turn. 
We only observe the performance of existing exporters and are only interested in the 
effectiveness of export promotion during the crisis.  Therefore, we limit the sample to 
firms that were exporting in 2006 and we evaluate how they perform in the years 
following.  Equations (3) and (4) are both estimated on a cross-section of firms and 
instead of firm and time-fixed effects we now include sector-fixed effects 𝛾𝑆  and for 
Peru region-fixed effects as well.  We consider two dependent variables: a dummy 
variable for the export status of firm i in year t and, only for the subset of export market 
survivors, the logarithm of a firm’s export level in year t.  If supported firms are more 
likely to survive on the export market, the 𝛼1 coefficient will be positive.  Conditioning 
on export market survival, the 𝛼2 coefficient measures whether client firms are able to 
export more than firms not receiving support. 
We run separate regressions for years t ∈ {2008, 2009, 2010}, which makes it 
straightforward to analyze changes at the extensive and intensive margin in a symmetric 
way.  The treatment variable of interest only focuses on support during the crisis.  It 
indicates whether firm i benefitted from export promotion support at any time between 
2007, the year before the start of the global crisis, and year t: Any_Support𝑖𝑡 =
max(Support𝑖07, … , Support𝑖𝑡).
20
  
We first estimate equations (3) and (4) with ordinary least squares, but to verify 
robustness we also implement a matching estimator that selects a comparison firm from 
the non-clients using the propensity score estimated by the following treatment model: 
Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .    (2’) 
                                                          
19 We later use a comparable specification, without the firm-fixed effects, to predict the propensity score. 
20 Berman et al. (2012) provides evidence that time-to-ship plays an important role during financial crises, making more distant 
trading relationships more vulnerable.  Hence, we look at treatment up to year t, using the year as the performance variable, 
rather than only looking for effects of lagged treatment. 
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As a further robustness check we also use the inverse of the propensity score directly 
to weigh the observations in the regression, which is an estimator that has a double-
robust property (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  It yields consistent estimates when 
either the selection model or the treatment model is correctly specified.  As the optimal 
weighting scheme is derived for the linear case, we estimate equation (3) as a linear 
probability model, assuming a mean-zero and i.i.d., but otherwise unrestricted error 
term. 
Since both performance regressions as well as the selection model only use a cross-
section of firms, we cannot use firm or year-fixed effects, and lagged values are also of 
limited use.  Control variables from 2006 that are included in the Z vector include the 
value of exports as well as the number of products and destinations.  The initial export 
growth (i.e. from 2006 to 2007) and other firm characteristics like an importer dummy 
(for Belgium), size, and age (for Peru) are other control variables included.  One should 
note that conditioning on positive exports in 2006 already makes supported and control 
firms more similar than a random selection of firms would be.  Our estimates of the 
generic performance equation (1) reported in Figure 4 suggest that it is important to 
control for these pre-treatment (and pre-crisis) firm-level variables, particularly for 
initial growth rate in exports. 
Researchers often include firm-fixed effects in the performance regression, which 
gives the comparison between treated and other firms a difference-in-differences 
interpretation (e.g. Görg, Henry and Strobl, 2008; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008).  
It is then only necessary to make the selection-on-observables assumption conditional on 
the firm-specific unobservable.  Rather than exploiting variation within the firm over 
time, our preferred approach to identify the treatment effects focuses on the same set of 
initial exporters, but includes separate observations for each market j that a firm served 
in 2006.  This relies on variation within the firm across markets, rather than across time.  
We again investigate whether supported firms are more likely to survive and export 
larger volumes, but we now evaluate it separately for each of the export markets. 
In this formulation, we can again include a firm-fixed effect, but only if we observe 
some variation across markets in the explanatory variable of interest.  We introduce this 
across-market variation by interacting the Any_ Support𝑖𝑡  variable with an indicator X𝑗  
to investigate whether market j is likely to experience a particularly strong reduction in 
exports.  Equations (3) and (4) thus become  
I[Exports𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0] = ?̃?1 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 × X𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,         (5) 
ln (Exports𝑖𝑗𝑡) = ?̃?2 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 × X𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,  (6) 
The firm- and market-fixed effects absorb the uninteracted effects of both variables as 
well as the earlier control variables Z.  The coefficient on the interaction between the two 
indicators will be positive if support is particularly effective in markets hit the most by 
the financial crisis. 
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We implement this approach in three ways.  First, we consider different destination 
markets and use a dummy variable to see whether a country experienced a financial 
crisis over the same period that we measure export promotion support—the interaction 
variable is X𝑗𝑡  in this case.
21
  Second, we consider different product markets, defined at 
the 2-digit HS level.  Products are considered particularly prone to export reductions if 
they fall under one of the Broad Economic Classification (BEC) product categories for 
which Levchenko et al. (2010) measured the largest reduction in trade for the United 
States or, alternatively, if the average firm in a product category is particularly finance 
intensive.
22
  Third, we define markets as destination-product (HS 2-digit) combinations 
and measure whether each market experienced an above-average reduction in exports in 
a surrogate country—this being the Netherlands for Belgium and Chile for Peru.  In this 
last case, the j index corresponds to a destination-product interaction. 
7. RESULTS 
7.1. Preliminary evidence to support the preferred specification 
To illustrate which firms ask for export promotion support, we first show results for 
the linear probability model (2) with a time-varying support dummy as dependent 
variable.  In the first column of Table 3 (for each country) we include several dimensions 
of firms’ lagged export market engagement in the regression, but no firm-fixed effects.  
As these variables are highly collinear, we find few consistent patterns across the two 
countries, except for the more frequent use of export promotion by firms that export to 
many destinations.  In Belgium the lagged value of exports and the number of products 
are negatively correlated with participation in the program, while in Peru exporting a 
large number of products is positively correlated with participation.  Note that if we only 
include a single dimension of export market engagement, we find a positive and highly 
significant coefficient in both countries for any possible choice.  
[Include Table 3 approximately here] 
In columns (3) and (6) we show results that include firm-fixed effects in the 
regression.  We still included lagged variables for export market engagement, value, 
products, and destinations, but hardly any of these variables have any predictive power 
for support status when we control flexibly for a firm-level unobservable.  The p-values 
for an F-test of joint insignificance of the three lagged variables is, respectively 0.085 
and 0.116, for Belgium and Peru, indicating that the three variables combined have 
barely any predictive value.  Adding two-year lags even raises the p-values for the test of 
                                                          
21 We use the union of the country-year specific indicators from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
to measure incidences of banking or financial crises in the 2007-2010 period. 
22  The BEC categories with an above-average export reduction are industrial supplies (210,220), fuels and lubricants 
(310,321,322), capital goods (410), and transport equipment and parts (510,521,530).  Following Bricongne et al. (2010), we 
operationalize the Rajan-Zingales measure of finance intensity on our data by looking at the average ratio of cash flow to value 
added in each product category. 
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joint insignificance to 0.267 and 0.411.  Self-selection into these programs based on 
immediately prior performance seems to be rare. 
Self-selection based on some unobservable firm type, however, does seem to take 
place.  Simply replacing the firm-fixed effects and one (or two) year lagged values by a 
lagged support indicator already achieves much of the increase in R2 from column (1) to 
(3) or from column (4) to (6).  The very precisely estimated positive coefficients indicate 
that there is much persistence in firms’ participation. 
The coefficients on the firm characteristics do not yield any surprises.  Belgian firms 
that export both within and outside the EU are more likely to ask for support, as do firms 
that import goods as well.  Large Belgian firms are more likely to ask for support, but a 
firm-fixed effect accounts entirely for this effect.  In Peru, by contrast, the time-varying 
dimension of firm size is still correlated with support, implying that as firms hire more 
workers, they are simultaneously turning to PROMPERU for assistance to expand 
abroad.
23
  
We will include the different dimensions of export market attachment as well as other 
firm characteristics in all performance regressions.  Moreover, we estimate a probit 
model on the subset of firms included in the performance regressions to calculate the 
propensity score for each firm, using the same set of control variables as in columns (1) 
and (4).  These estimates are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
A second set of results that informed our preferred performance specification is 
reported in Figure 4.
24
  We estimated equation (1), regressing the time-varying export 
value (in logs) on support, additionally including leads and lags of the support indicator 
relative to the moment of support (time t), i.e. we replace 𝛼𝑆𝑖𝑡  by a linear combination 
∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑘
+𝐾
𝑘=−𝐾  with K=4 for Belgium and K=3 for Peru.  By including firm-fixed effects 
in the regression, exports are normalized to zero in the treatment year.  As the sample 
includes firms that never receive support and the equation includes calendar year 
dummies, the estimates represent the difference in the evolution of exports for clients 
relative to non-clients leading up to and following export support. 
[Include Figure 4 approximately here] 
The black markers with solid lines in Figure 4 are for new clients, i.e. firms that 
receive export support for the first time at some point during the 2006-2011 period.  
While these firms record higher exports following their first support instance in both 
countries, the export trajectory leading up to this year t looks different for new clients.  
The low level of exports in years t-4 to t-1, both for Belgian and Peruvian firms, suggests 
that firms do not show up randomly at the export promotion agencies.  Even though the 
point estimates on the first two lags are often insignificant, which is consistent with the 
evidence in Table 3, the longer time trend is nevertheless informative. 
                                                          
23 Due to data availability reasons we measure firm size by the value of fixed assets in Belgium and by total employment in 
Peru, both in logarithms. 
24 The exact coefficient estimates with standard errors are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
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The picture is different for continuous exporters.  The comparable estimates for the 
sample of these exporters shown by the dashed lines reveal that lower export levels 
leading up to treatment are less notable for Belgian firms and entirely absent in Peru.
25
  
Note that these coefficients are estimated more precisely since mature exporters 
experience less pronounced swings in foreign sales. 
Our takeaway from these graphs is that, to be on the safe side, we need to include 
export growth in the pre-support period as an explicit control in the performance 
regressions not featuring firm-fixed effects, in addition to the firm characteristics and 
export market attachment discussed earlier.  This finding also motivates the 
specifications that exploit variation within firms across markets, rather than over time. 
7.2. Firm-level performance differences for supported firms 
Following the initial evidence that motivated specifications (3) and (4), we report the 
estimates of firm-level export performance differences for supported and other firms in 
Table 4.  Each coefficient, or set of two coefficients in the case of specification (ii), is 
estimated using a separate regression.  We show separate results for export status and 
export volume as dependent variables (in the top and bottom panel) and for both 
Belgium and Peru (left and right).  Throughout, the sample consists of firms that were 
exporting in 2006.  All regressions contain control variables for firms’ export market 
attachment in 2006, the growth rate of exports between 2006 and 2007, several firm 
characteristics, industry-fixed effects, and for Peru additional region-fixed effects.  The 
point estimates for the control variables of one set of regressions are reported in Table 
A.3 in the Appendix.  
The baseline results in line (i) are estimated with ordinary least squares.  Of the twelve 
coefficients on the support variable, all are estimated positively and eleven are 
statistically significantly different from zero.  They indicate that firms receiving support 
are indeed more likely to continue exporting over the crisis and that their export values 
are higher than those of control firms.  
[Include Table 4 approximately here] 
For Belgium, the unconditional probability of export market survival is 65% in 2008 
and 55% in 2010.  For firms that received export promotion this probability is on 
average one twentieth higher in 2008 and almost one sixth higher in 2010; see panel (a).  
These differences are economically large and for Peru they are estimated to be even 
larger, at one seventh in 2008 and one third in 2010.  The control variables, especially 
prior export growth, indicate that a stronger initial export intensity raises the likelihood 
of survival on the export market, as expected.  Without the firm characteristics, the 
                                                          
25 For Belgium we also observe the intensity that firms use export promotion services within each year.  The grey markers 
show the evolution of exports leading up to and following a spike in support, defined as a doubling in annual support instances 
(or a tripling in the case that the firm used the services only once in the preceding year).  They measure the relative export 
evolution for existing clients that decide to work more intensively with the export promotion agency.  The evolution, including 
the pre-treatment export growth, is highly similar to that of new clients. 
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differences between supported and other firms are approximately twice as large, but 
export promotion is still associated with better performance even after conditioning on 
observables. 
The difference in the level of exports for supported firms, reported in panel (b), is 
equally large.  Relative to control firms, export levels are approximately 20% higher for 
supported firms.  Only in 2008 for Peru is the coefficient much lower and insignificant.  
Except for this one outlier all point estimates come out remarkably similar. 
To accommodate the much higher reporting thresholds for exports within the EU by 
Belgian firms, the specification reported in line (ii) adds an interaction term between the 
support dummy and the indicator for firms reporting some intra-EU exports.  These 
firms tend to be a lot larger.  The results indicate that the benefits of export support for 
firm survival come almost entirely from the extra-EU activities that are dominated by 
smaller exporters.  The interaction term is always strongly negative and in the first two 
years it negates the entire baseline effect.  Only for the estimates in 2010 is there a 
significantly positive difference for intra-EU exporters as well, estimated at 5%—the 
sum of the point estimates on the uninteracted and interacted support indicators. 
There is a difficulty, however, in interpreting these results.  The more positive 
estimates on export market survival for firms only exporting extra-EU could be due to a 
stronger effect either for more distant destinations or for smaller exporters.  As a 
robustness check, we re-ran the regressions recoding all export-status dummies to zero if 
the total export value of a firm, combining intra and extra-EU trade, fell below the €1 
million threshold.  Unfortunately, these results are inconclusive.  For 2008 and 2009, the 
effect on survival for firms also exporting intra-EU is positive and significant, while it is 
not significantly different from zero for firms only exporting extra-EU.  In 2010, the 
results flip, with positive and significant estimates only for firms exporting solely extra-
EU. 
If the higher survival probability on extra-EU compared to intra-EU markets is not due 
to distance, but due to a stronger relationship between export promotion and survival for 
smaller exporters, the total effect might be underestimated for Belgium.  Many small 
exporters that only serve EU markets might enjoy positive effects of this program, but as 
their intra-EU exports fall below the reporting threshold, our point estimates on the intra-
EU exports only reflect the experience of larger exporters.  This sample selection could 
be one reason why the extensive margin differences for Belgium are estimated to be 
lower than for Peru. 
This interpretation is buttressed by the regressions that weigh observations by their 
initial export value, reported in line (iii), which lead to slightly lower point estimates on 
the support indicators.  If we consider export value a proxy for firm size, this evidence is 
consistent with the literature in suggesting that performance differences for supported 
firms are declining with firm size. 
We also used two estimators that achieve the conditioning on observables in a more 
flexible way and are more robust to misspecification of the functional forms of the 
performance or selection equations.  The estimates in line (iv) use propensity score 
matching and in line (v) inverse probability weighting to control for self-selection.  
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These results are in line with the baseline OLS estimates.  Supported firms record 
stronger export performance during the crisis, although in most cases the absolute 
performance differences are estimated slightly lower with these alternative estimators.  
7.3. Effects of export promotion at the extensive and intensive margins 
The specifications reported in Table 4 did not allow the inclusion of firm-fixed effects.  
We next exploit export performance differences at the firm-market level, making it 
possible to control for an unobservable firm effect when investigating the effects of 
export promotion support.  These estimates control flexibly for a firm’s average 
performance and identify the effect of export promotion solely from the differential 
performance of the same firm across destination or product markets.  The results in the 
next three tables investigate whether supported firms are more likely to survive and/or 
export larger volumes than control firms in destinations that are hit by the financial 
crisis, in product markets that are sensitive to the crisis, or in product-destination 
markets where firms from a surrogate country experienced a larger than average decline 
in exports. 
The first set of results show that supported firms indeed experience a stronger export 
performance than control firms precisely in destinations that were hit by a financial 
crisis.  The sample now contains all firm-destination pairs with positive exports in 2006.  
To get an idea of the overall effect, combining the extensive and intensive margins, we 
follow a standard approach from the literature of keeping zero-trade observations in the 
sample and using the logarithm of total exports plus one as dependent variable.
26
  All 
original firm-destinations thus remain in the analysis even if a firm exits a particular 
export market.  The implicit assumption is that the marginal effect of support (in 
percentage terms) is the same at the extensive and intensive margin.  These effects, 
reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix for the current specification as well as the next 
two, are estimated to be strongly positive in both countries in all three years we 
consider.
27
 
In the two panels of Table 5, we investigate whether the superior performance of 
supported firms is due to a higher survival probability in destinations hit by the financial 
crisis or to a higher export volume in relative terms—in practice, this is likely to mean a 
smaller reduction in export volume for those destinations.  The results unequivocally 
pinpoint the extensive destination margin as the primary channel responsible for the 
superior firm-level performance.  Supported firms are significantly more likely to remain 
active in destinations that experienced a financial crisis. 
[Include Table 5 approximately here] 
                                                          
26 In practice, we add €100 to Belgian exports (the minimum threshold we used for a trade flow to be included in the sample) 
and $100 to Peruvian exports before taking logarithms.  
27 These results are based on a specification with a full set of firm and country fixed effects to control flexibly for unobservable 
differences that affect all firms in a destination or all destinations served by one firm in the same way.  Estimating the same 
model, but using the earlier firm characteristics as controls, we obtained point estimates that are extremely similar to the firm-
level intensive margin estimates in Table 4(b), which is intuitive. 
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For Belgian firms, export volumes are not significantly different between supported 
and control firms that survive in those destinations.  The point estimates at the intensive 
margin are very close to zero.  For Peruvian firms, the three point estimates on the 
intensive margin in Table 5(b) are positive, but only one is statistically significant at the 
10% level.  The effects tend to be strongest, both for Belgium and for Peru, in 2009, 
when the financial crisis and the trade collapse was most pronounced. 
The next set of results, reported in Table 6, are estimated on a sample of firm-product 
observations, where all 2-digit HS product categories that sample firms exported to in 
2006 are included as separate observations.  It again allows the inclusion of firm-fixed 
effects to control for a firm-level unobservable that affects all of a firm’s products 
similarly.  The effect of export promotion is now identified by interacting the support 
dummy with an indicator for product categories that we expect to suffer most during the 
crisis.  As explained in Section 6, we used two alternative indicators from the literature 
to select those products. 
The results reported in line (i) characterize products by their type of use—e.g. capital 
goods, processed intermediates, durable consumption goods—according to the BEC 
classification.  The product categories that experienced the largest trade decline in the 
United States during the crisis, as reported in Levchenko et al. (2010), are classified as 
the most crisis-prone.  For all the corresponding 2-digit HS products, the indicator X𝑗  in 
specifications (5) and (6) has been changed to 1. 
[Include Table 6 approximately here] 
The overall effects of export promotion, in Table A.4(b), are again large and positive 
for Belgian firms.  This is entirely due to a strong and highly significant effect at the 
extensive product margin, in panel (a) of Table 6, while the difference in export volumes 
for supported and other firms is not systematically larger for crisis-prone products.  
Supported firms have a 25% to 34% higher likelihood of continuing to export crisis-
prone products. 
The point estimates for Peruvian firms are also large overall, but they are much less 
precise and not statistically different from zero.  Recall from the discussion in Section 5 
that Peruvian exports are highly concentrated in some sectors.  The vast majority of its 
exports are raw materials and processed intermediates.  This is very different from the 
situation for Belgian firms which are tightly integrated in an EU production network.  It 
is not entirely surprising that the type of product, and thus the stage of the production 
chain a firm is responsible for, turns out to matter the most for Belgium. 
Results reported in line (ii) are obtained from separate regressions, using a different 
criterion to identify product categories where we expect a disproportionate effect from 
the crisis.  We calculated the cash flow to value added ratio for all active firms prior to 
the crisis and select 2-digit HS product categories where the average ratio is above the 
manufacturing average.  This approach was suggested by Bricongne et al. (2010) to 
implement the Rajan-Zingales measure of finance intensity on Amadeus data, which is 
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similar to the Belgian data we have access to.  Because the corresponding firm-level 
information is not available for Peru, we did not implement this robustness check there. 
The results are broadly consistent with those in line (i).  A strong overall positive 
effect is driven entirely by the extensive margin response, while the intensive margin 
effect is always estimated negatively, most likely due to a change in sample 
composition, which we discuss below. 
In the final set of results, reported in Table 7, the interaction term is switched to 1 if a 
product-destination market experienced a higher than average reduction in exports 
during the crisis.  To avoid including an endogenous variable on the right-hand side, we 
estimate this reduction by using the exports of a neighboring country that is similar in 
size and level of development, the Netherlands for Belgium and Chile for Peru.  In the 
performance regressions we include product-destination interaction fixed effects and 
again identify the effectiveness of export promotion from the differential performance of 
supported firms across differentially affected export markets. 
[Include Table 7 approximately here] 
Once again, the results for Belgium pinpoint the extensive margin as the sole driver for 
the overall positive effect.  All extensive margin coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant, and even the magnitude of the effects is remarkably consistent across all 
specifications, from Table 4 to Table 7.  The point estimate on the survival probability is 
30% in 2008 and 20% in 2010.  Note that these coefficients have a double-difference 
interpretation; namely, the survival difference in strongly affected export markets 
compared to other markets is 20 to 30% higher for supported firms than for control 
firms. 
In Table 7, the intensive margin estimates for Belgian firms are again negative, but 
what is notable is that they become statistically significant.  While counterintuitive at 
first, this is not entirely surprising, since the large differences in survival probability 
from panel (b) change the composition of export relationships in later years.  Given that 
smaller trading relationships have a much greater likelihood of being disrupted, 
especially for unsupported firms, it is not surprising that the point estimates become 
negative in panel (c).  Any positive trade-boosting effect is swamped by an adverse 
compositional effect. 
For Peru, export promotion improves performance on both margins.  Supported firms 
are relatively more likely to survive on severely affected markets, but they also record 
relatively higher export volumes.  These differences only appear once the crisis hits in 
full, starting in 2009.  Standard errors are a lot larger on the estimates for Peru, which 
could be due to a less complete production and export overlap between Peru and Chile 
than between Belgium and the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, the intensive margin effects 
are so large that they are still highly significant in 2009 and 2010. 
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8. POLICY DISCUSSION 
Our estimates provide consistent evidence that firms receiving export promotion 
support during the crisis performed better.  They were more likely to remain active in 
export markets and they exported higher volumes relative to control firms.  The most 
robust channel for this superior relative performance was the higher likelihood of 
remaining active exporters in export destinations or in product categories that were most 
affected by the financial crisis. 
In this last section, we take a step back and consider the policy relevance of these 
findings.  In particular, we address the following two questions.  Is it likely that 
systematically scaling up these programs during a cyclical downturn would provide 
additional benefits?  And, are the net benefits of these programs, taking their costs into 
account, also positive? 
A priori, it is unlikely that these programs could become a major policy tool to cushion 
the business cycle fluctuations that exporters face.  The existing programs are minuscule 
in comparison to aggregate export sales, and the activities they perform are also not 
easily adapted to provide rapid interventions or adjust with the business cycle.  The 
primary role of these agencies is to act as an information broker and help firms deal with 
problems of asymmetric information or transaction costs.  To accomplish this, they 
invest in accumulating internal knowledge as well as a foreign network of support 
offices that is permanently available. 
Moreover, most support is initiated by client firms, and pushing support to potential or 
current exporters is unlikely to generate positive effects of a similar magnitude as those 
we estimated from the current operations.
28
  We do not have direct evidence suggesting 
the programs are capacity-constrained and that increasing their budget would 
automatically raise the benefits they generate.  It is notable, however, that the type of 
activity that saw the second strongest increase over the crisis period is “Actions,” the 
category where the agency is most able to take initiative itself, e.g. by organizing 
seminars or trade missions (this breakdown is only available for Belgium).
29
 
Another caveat is that in the 2009 recession, government deficits soared and budgets 
were tightened for governmental services existing at that time.  Without dedicated funds 
to adapt their activities, agencies were limited in their response to the crisis.  The effects 
we estimate are from a time period where agencies were especially constrained in 
engaging in additional activities, given the need to continue covering their fixed costs. 
Having said that, a number of patterns we document here are encouraging for the 
countercyclical potential of export promotion programs.  First, effects are particularly 
strong at the extensive margin.  As exporting involves sunk entry costs as well as fixed 
costs that are incurred each year, providing export promotion support at the precise 
moment where  budgets for recurring fixed costs are tight can avoid inefficient export 
market churn.  The especially robust results at the destination-extensive margin further 
                                                          
28 However, Munch and Schaur (2015) show that positive effects are of a similar magnitude regardless of whether firms take 
the initiative and request support themselves or the agency selects firms independently. 
29 Unsurprisingly, giving the tightened credit constraints, the “Subsidy” category increased the most. 
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underscore the benefit of export promotion as a way of diversifying sales and helping 
hedge against local business cycle fluctuations. 
Second, along the same lines, estimated effects for Belgium are larger for exports 
outside the EU, while the vast majority of Peruvian exports leave the region.  As 
business cycles tend to be less synchronized for countries that are farther apart, there is 
an opportunity to tap into markets where demand is not depressed during a domestic 
recession.
30
 
Third, the evidence also shows that export promotion especially helped firms survive 
in export markets that experienced a financial crisis.  This is not surprising since 
exporting tends to be a capital and credit intensive activity.  We expected export 
promotion to be effective in helping firms navigate protectionist measures that often 
become more popular during cyclical downturns.  During the last recession, however, 
countries were remarkably restrained in this area and we did not find sufficient such 
instances to test this prediction. 
We now turn to the second question.  While the results provide strong evidence for a 
positive impact on firm-level export performance, it is possible that the costs associated 
with these programs still outweigh the benefits.  Carrying out a complete cost-benefit 
analysis would require detailed information on the variable and fixed costs of providing 
these services, in particular on the marginal case where support is provided.  It would 
also require an assessment determining to what extent the services merely crowd out 
private expenses or whether a public program makes it possible that firms avoid 
duplicating costs.  Some of the increased exports might come at the expense of third 
countries, an issue of particular concern for the EU since it limits state aid, but also to 
the WTO, which prohibits direct export subsidies.  At the benefit side, it would matter 
greatly whether supported firms are able to reap long-term benefits or not.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the net welfare gain to society from an extra dollar or euro of export sales is 
hard to determine, but it is likely to be higher during recessions. 
We mention two quantitative implications of our point estimates.  First, if one 
interprets the point estimates as causal effects, their magnitudes imply very large gains 
from these programs in terms of absolute export volumes.  For example, using the 
“crisis-prone” firm-product estimates from Table 6 we calculate that the estimated 
extensive margin effect alone implies €2.8 billion higher exports of crisis-prone products 
for treated firms.
31
  The aggregate effects are only slightly smaller in magnitude for 2009 
and 2010, at €1.8 and €2.4 billion, but the decline in aggregate exports in those years 
would require a proportionate downscaling of the program effects.  Even if only a small 
fraction of these marginal export sales represent a welfare gain, netting out the 
opportunity costs of the resources, it is not implausible that these programs provide a 
positive return.  Especially in a cyclical downturn, anything stimulating effective 
aggregate demand is valuable. 
                                                          
30 Note, however, that the extra-EU trade flows are subject to a much lower reporting requirement.  The stronger effects on 
survival extra-EU could also be caused by stronger effects of export promotion on smaller exporters. 
31  The corresponding effects using the estimate based on finance-intensive products (for 2008 and only for treated 
observations) is €1.4 billion and using the firm-destination estimates it is €4.2 billion. 
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An alternative approach would be to calculate the immediate return on investment 
from the government’s perspective.  On the narrow question, whether the tax revenue on 
corporate profits generated by the extra exports at least covers the budget of the export 
promotion agency, we can mostly answer affirmatively.  Using the most conservative 
(lowest) point estimates from Table 4, we calculate the expected increase in exports 
associated with each trade promotion program from both the extensive and the intensive 
margin responses.  For each country, we multiply this addition to firm sales with the 
average profit-to-sales ratio and with the corporate tax rate and we subtract the annual 
operating cost of the agency.  We find that the resulting net gain in government revenue 
in Belgium varies between €3.3 million in 2008 and €36.9 million in 2010.  For Peru, the 
net return turns positive in 2010 at €3.8 million.  While this simple cost-benefit 
calculation indicates that export promotion is currently covering its own costs, the net 
gain in government revenue remains modest, which is what we would expect. 
Given the significantly higher exports for firms participating in these programs as well 
as their positive net present value, one might wonder whether or not firms could operate 
them privately, independent from the government.  Since the programs are most valuable 
when they operate at a minimum scale, one difficulty is to overcome coordination costs, 
making it difficult to roll them out gradually.  Operating these programs privately does 
not seem impossible, as shown in Hiller (2012), which studies a private, non-profit 
association in Denmark that provides export promotion support to member firms.  It is 
particularly feasible for a larger economy, like Germany, whose Chambers of Commerce 
Abroad network operates 120 offices in 80 countries (in 2013), with more than 1,700 
staff to promote German commercial interests. 
Even for the programs that remain in the public realm, we definitely observe an 
increase in the reliance on user fees for funding and pressure to increase this further.  
Munch and Schaur (2015) study the program operated by the Danish Trade Council, a 
government agency selling firms export promotion services at subsidized rates that cover 
approximately 50% of the cost.  The Swiss program, Switzerland Global Enterprise, also 
recovers a significant share of its total budget from fees. 
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Figure 1.  Long-term evolution of aggregate exports
Belgium Peru
Notes:
Belgium: 1998-2013, in billions of EUR;  Peru 2000-2012, in billions of USD.
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Figure 2.  Evolution of exports over the crisis by adjustment margin or destination
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Figure 3.  Evolution of export promotion activities over the crisis
Belgium Peru
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Figure 4.  Evolution of exports prior and following export promotion instances
Belgium Peru
Sources:  Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
New clients refer to support instances that are a firm's first in the 2006-2011 period.  A support spike is a doubling of support instances in a year; 
for firms only receiving support once, a spike is only registered if support at least triples. Regressions include firm, sector, year-fixed effects and 
other controls. Coefficient errors and standard errors are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Cross-country Volpe Martincus (2010)
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Denmark Munch and Schaur (2015)
United Kingdom Rincón-Aznar, Riley and Rosso (2015)
Chile Álvarez, Crespi, and Volpe Martincus (2014)
a
 Effectiveness is gauged from firms' responses to a survey.
Table 1:  Summary of the literature evaluating the impact of export promotion programs
The Impact of Firm-Level Export Promotion: New Dimensions
Notes: 
Macro Perspective
Export Promotion Measure: Financial Resources Devoted to Export Promotion
Export Promotion Measure: Network of Foreign Offices
Micro Perspective
The Impact of F´irm-Level Export Promotion on Firms Export Outcomes
Table 2:  Composition of the sample
Only export
Only receive 
support
Export & 
support
Only export
Only receive 
support
Export & 
support
Observations:
2006 20,824 1,552 2,200 6,101 656 371
2007 20,535 1,609 2,210 6,252 1,001 420
2008 21,384 1,752 2,249 6,639 1,228 508
2009 19,819 1,983 2,302 6,862 1,188 560
2010 18,878 2,288 2,432 7,033 999 490
2011 18,034 1,919 2,075 7,373 937 579
2006-2011 119,474 11,103 13,468 40,260 6,009 2,928
Firms:
2006-2011 40,027 4,761 5,793 16,330 4,586 1,831
Sources:  Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Belgium Peru
Number of firms that Number of firms that 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged support 0.609*** 0.459***
(0.007) (0.016)
Export growth in 2006-07  0.003  0.001* 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Export value (log) (t-1) -0.010*** -0.004*** 0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
No. of products (log) (t-1) -0.009*** -0.004*** 0.002 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
No. of destinations (log) (t-1)  0.080***  0.029*** -0.001 0.049*** 0.031*** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Export intra & extra region  0.040***  0.018*** 0.011***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Importer dummy  0.013***  0.008*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Size  0.009***  0.003*** 0.0002 0.005** 0.003** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Age -0.003 -0.002 0.027
(0.006) (0.004) (0.020)
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
p-value for F-test of joint 
significance of all lagged variables 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.151 0.116
R-squared (overall) 0.116 0.450 0.704 0.059 0.217 0.550
R-squared (within) 0.002 0.004
Number of observations 63,124 63,124 63,124 15,563 15,563 15,563
Notes:
Table 3:  Selection of firms into treatment
Peru
Sources: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Belgium
2006-2010
dependent variable is a time-varying dummy variable for export promotion support
Linear probability model estimated on firms that were exporting in 2006. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by firm.
2006-2010
Table 4:  Firm-level estimates of export performance differences for supported firms
(a) Firm extensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Coefficient on "Supported at least once in [2007, t ]"
(i) OLS estimates 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.133*** 0.154***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
(ii) Supported (uninteracted effect) 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.130***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.013)
     Supported * some exports within-EU -0.121*** -0.093*** -0.080***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
(iii) Weighted regression 0.024*** 0.041*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.122*** 0.149***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(iv) Propensity score matching 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.113*** 0.131***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
0.042*** 0.052*** 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.126*** 0.141***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Number of observations 23,024 23,024 23,024 6,268 6,268 6,268
(b) Firm intensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Coefficient on "Supported at least once in [2007, t ]"
(i) OLS estimates 0.184*** 0.249*** 0.172*** 0.033 0.185*** 0.206***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.041) (0.055) (0.058) (0.064)
(iii) Weighted regression 0.154*** 0.217*** 0.150*** 0.036 0.172*** 0.189***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.048) (0.051) (0.062)
(iv) Propensity score matching 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.242*** -0.044 0.225*** 0.134*
(0.071) (0.067) (0.073) (0.078) (0.063) (0.081)
0.166*** 0.237*** 0.172*** 0.000 0.148*** 0.163***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.038) (0.051) (0.054) (0.062)
Number of observations 14,958 13,743 12,742 3,495 3,015 2,658
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the firm level for 
year t
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is log of firm-level exports for export market survivors in year 
t
(v) Inverse probability weighting with regression 
adjustment
(v) Inverse probability weighting with regression 
adjustment
Sources: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Notes: 
Belgium Peru
(b) Sample of 2006 exporters that still export in year t.
Coefficients on the included control variables are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix for the specification in (ii).  The propensity score used in 
the estimators in (iii) and (iv) is calculated based on the probit regressions reported in Table A.1. 
(a) Sample of exporters in 2006, linear probability model.
Table 5: Effect of export promotion at the firm-destination level during the crisis
(a)  Extensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
0.014** 0.024*** 0.007 0.037 0.044** 0.053**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 141,189 141,189 141,189 16,092 16,092 16,092
(b)  Intensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
-0.015 -0.020 -0.036 0.168 0.262* 0.128
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.161) (0.152) (0.170)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 91,207 83,062 76,538 8,182 7,049 6,333
Notes:
Destination countries are classified as experiencing a financial crisis if the country-year specific indicators from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) 
or Laeven and Valencia (2012) indicated a banking or financial crises in the 2007-t  period.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by 
firm.
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
country j financial crisis in [2007, t ]
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the firm-
destination level (ij ) for year t
Belgium Peru
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
country j financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is log of firm-destination export level (ij ) for export 
market survivors in year t
Table 6: Effect of export promotion at the firm-product level during the crisis
(a)  Extensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
0.342** 0.295*** 0.248*** 0.068 -0.004 -0.041
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.064) (0.053) (0.046)
0.203*** 0.172*** 0.142***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 68,040 68,040 68,040 20,001 20,001 20,001
(b)  Intensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
0.027 -0.138 -0.116 -0.032 0.753 1.057
(0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.673) (0.599) (0.680)
0.097 -0.146 -0.186*
(0.096) (0.097) (0.097)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 42,391 39,114 36,375 8,400 7,033 6,250
Notes:
Each panel reports the results on two different interaction terms which are estimated using separate regressions.  The sample and level of analysis 
is the same, but the indicator variables to identify which HS 2-digit product categories are most affected by the crisis is different.
(i)  Products are classified as crisis-prone if they fall in one of the Broad Economic Classification (BEC) product categories with larger than 
average reduction in trade over the crisis for the United States (Levchenko et al., 2010), namely industrial supplies (210,220), fuels and lubricants 
(310,321,322), capital goods (410), and transport equipment and parts (510,521,530).  
(ii) Products are classified as finance intensive if the average ratio of cash flow to value added across all firms in a product category is higher than 
average (see Bricongne et al., 2010).
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by firm.
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the firm-product 
level (ij ) for year t
Belgium Peru
(ii) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  is finance-intensive (Ranjan-Zingales)
(ii) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  is finance-intensive (Ranjan-Zingales)
(i) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  is crisis-prone (Levchenko et al.)
dependent variable is log of firm-product export level (ij ) for export market 
survivors in year t
(i) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  is crisis-prone (Levchenko et al.)
Belgium Peru
Table 7: Effect of export promotion at the firm-product-destination level during the crisis
(a)  Extensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
0.301*** 0.247*** 0.208*** 0.012 0.058** 0.043*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 308,762 308,931 309,012 35,126 35,126 35,126
(b)  Intensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
-0.069** -0.062** -0.070** 0.022 0.710** 1.141***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.391) (0.339) (0.359)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 191,561 172,895 159,107 13,701 11,384 10,179
Notes:
Product-destinations are classified as experiencing a steep export reduction if the export reduction over the crisis for the same product-destination 
market in the Netherlands (for Belgium) or Chile (for Peru)  was higher than average.   Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by firm.
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the firm-
product-destination level (ij ) for year t
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & product-
destination j  experienced a steep export reduction
dependent variable is log of firm-product-destination export level (ij ) for 
export market survivors in year t
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & product-
destination j  experienced a steep export reduction
Belgium Peru
Table A.1.  Probit estimate of the selection regression used to calculate the propensity score
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Export value in 2006 (log) -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.035*** 0.025* 0.021* 0.029**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Export growth in 2006-2007 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.312***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
Number of products in 2006 (log) -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 0.110*** 0.133*** 0.127***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) 0.396*** 0.379*** 0.357*** 0.139*** 0.206*** 0.232***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037)
Export intra & extra region 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.165***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Importer dummy 0.352*** 0.375*** 0.389***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
Size 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.021 0.029** 0.030**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Age 0.125** 0.185*** 0.219***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23024 23024 23024 6,268 6,268 6,268
dependent variable is a binary support indicator at the firm level for any export 
support in the [2007, t ] interval
Belgium Peru
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
t-4 -0.242 0.072 -0.087 0.065 -0.225 0.077
t-3 -0.195 0.055 -0.082 0.052 -0.193 0.057 -0.137 0.067 0.038 0.058
t-2 -0.062 0.045 -0.075 0.044 -0.080 0.048 -0.114 0.055 0.027 0.047
t-1 -0.108 0.038 -0.032 0.038 -0.031 0.043 -0.038 0.050 0.027 0.046
First (t) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.065 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.025 0.044 0.024 0.050 0.069 0.044
t+2 0.113 0.043 0.103 0.043 0.074 0.047 0.050 0.060 0.075 0.048
t+3 0.137 0.050 0.166 0.048 0.090 0.054 0.004 0.084 0.130 0.071
t+4 0.036 0.064 0.123 0.058 0.168 0.070
Notes:
Source:  Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
a
 New clients refer to support instances that are a firm's first in the 2006-2011 period.  
Peru
new clients
a                 
(all)
new clients
a 
(continuous exporters)
Year 
relative to 
first 
support 
instance
b
 A support spike is a doubling of support instances in a year (not observed in Peru); for firms only receiving support once, a spike is only 
registered if support at least triples.  
The dependent variable is log(exports) and all regressions include firm, sector, year fixed effects and controls for size, importer dummy, dummy 
for exports within and outside the region.
Table A.2.  Coefficient estimates underlying Figure 4
support spike
b 
(continuous exporter)
new clients
a                  
(all)
new clients
a  
(continuous exporters)
Belgium
(a) Firm extensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Supported at least once in 2007-2008 0.033*** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.014)
Supported at least once in 2007-2009 0.048*** 0.133***
(0.010) (0.015)
Supported at least once in 2007-2010 0.080*** 0.154***
(0.008) (0.016)
Export value in 2006 (log) 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Export growth in 2006-2007 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.179*** 0.137*** 0.113***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of products in 2006 (log) 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) 0.035* 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.004 0.004 0.009
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Export intra & extra region 0.008 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Importer dummy 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.096***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Size in 2006 (log) -0.006** -0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.021*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age in 2006 (log) 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.188***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23,024 23,024 23,024 6,268 6,268 6,268
                   (Firm-level estimates of export performance differences for supported firms)
Table A.3.  Complete regression results for specification (i) or (ii) of Table 4
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the firm level for year t
Belgium (ii) Peru (i)
Table A.3 (continued)
(b) Firm intensive margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Supported at least once in 2007-2008 0.184*** 0.033
(0.027) (0.055)
Supported at least once in 2007-2009 0.249*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.058)
Supported at least once in 2007-2010 0.172*** 0.206***
(0.041) (0.064)
Export value in 2006 (log) 0.881*** 0.816*** 0.795*** 0.770*** 0.711*** 0.696***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Export growth in 2006-2007 1.152*** 0.966*** 0.915*** 0.697*** 0.565*** 0.463***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040)
Number of products in 2006 (log) -0.008 0.003 0.023 -0.097*** -0.149*** -0.168***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) -0.014 -0.069*** -0.106*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.151***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.041) (0.051)
Export intra & extra region 0.429*** 0.703*** 0.666***
(0.047) (0.063) (0.055)
Importer dummy 0.188*** 0.245*** 0.319***
(0.042) (0.064) (0.061)
Size 0.019*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.127*** 0.197*** 0.236***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
Age 0.044 -0.107 -0.143*
(0.057) (0.066) (0.082)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 14,958 13,743 12,742 3,495 3,015 2,658
(a) Sample of exporters in 2006, linear probability model.
(b) Sample of 2006 exporters that still export in year t .
Source:  Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each country and 
supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Notes: 
dependent variable is log of firm-level exports for export market survivors in year t
Belgium (ii) Peru (i)
Table A.4.  Total effect of export promotion during the crisis estimated at the firm-market level
(a)  Firm-destination total margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
0.347*** 0.500*** 0.344*** 0.690** 0.801*** 0.874***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.091) (0.329) (0.281) (0.269)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 141,189 141,189 141,189 16,092 16,092 16,092
(b)  Firm-product total margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
3.818*** 3.152*** 2.664*** 0.818 -0.177 -0.634
(0.164) (0.157) (0.155) (0.764) (0.657) (0.581)
2.291*** 1.893*** 1.562***
(0.138) (0.134) (0.126)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 68,040 68,040 68,040 20,001 20,001 20,001
(c)  Firm-product-destination total margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) (6c)
3.032*** 2.469*** 2.103*** 0.494 0.933*** 0.981***
(0.073) (0.066) (0.065) (0.411) (0.317) (0.304)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 308,762 308,931 309,012 35,126 35,126 35,126
Notes:
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is log(exportsijt +1),  j  = destination market
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & country 
j financial crisis in [2007, t ]
The classification of countries that experienced a financial crisis in panel (a) is the same as in Table 5, the classification of crisis-prone or finance-
intensive products in panel (b) is the same as in Table 6, the classification of product-destinations that experienced a steep export reduction in panel 
(c) is the same as in Table 7.
dependent variable is log(exportsijt +1),  j  = product market
dependent variable is log(exportsijt +1),  j  = product-destination market
(i) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  crisis-prone (Levchenko et al.)
a
(ii) Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & 
product j  finance-intensive (Ranjan-Zingales)
b
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once & product-
destination j  experienced a steep export reduction
Belgium Peru
Belgium Peru
